IPSECCONF(1M) Maintenance Commands IPSECCONF(1M)


NAME


ipsecconf - configure system wide IPsec policy

SYNOPSIS


/usr/sbin/ipsecconf


/usr/sbin/ipsecconf -a file [-q]


/usr/sbin/ipsecconf -c file


/usr/sbin/ipsecconf -d [-i tunnel-name] {index, tunnel-name, index}


/usr/sbin/ipsecconf -f [-i tunnel-name]


/usr/sbin/ipsecconf -F


/usr/sbin/ipsecconf -l [-i tunnel-name] [-n]


/usr/sbin/ipsecconf -L [-n]


DESCRIPTION


The ipsecconf utility configures the IPsec policy for a host or for one
of its tunnels. Once the policy is configured, all outbound and inbound
datagrams are subject to policy checks as they exit and enter the host or
tunnel. For the host policy, if no entry is found, no policy checks will
be completed, and all the traffic will pass through. For a tunnel, if no
entry is found and there is at least one entry for the tunnel, the
traffic will automatically drop. The difference in behavior is because of
the assumptions about IPsec tunnels made in many implementations.
Datagrams that are being forwarded will not be subjected to policy checks
that are added using this command. See ifconfig(1M) and dladm(1M) for
information on how to protect forwarded packets. Depending upon the
match of the policy entry, a specific action will be taken.


This command can be run only by superuser.


Each entry can protect traffic in either one direction (requiring a pair
of entries) or by a single policy entry which installs the needed
symmetric sadb rules.


When the command is issued without any arguments, the list of file policy
entries loaded are shown. To display the (spd p.e.s) use the -l option.
Both will display the index number for the entry. To specify a single
tunnel's SPD, use the -i option in combination with -l. To specify all
SPDs, both host and for all tunnels, use -L.


Note, since one file policy entry (FPE) can generate multiple SPD pol
entries (SPEs), the list of FPEs may not show all the actual entries.
However, it is still useful in determining what what rules have been
added to get the spd into its current state.


You can use the -d option with the index to delete a given policy in the
system. If the -d option removes an FPE entry that produces multiple
SPEs, only then SPD with the same policy index as the FPE will be
removed. This can produce a situation where there may be SPEs when there
are no FPEs.


As with -l, -d can use the -i flag to indicate a tunnel. An alternate
syntax is to specify a tunnel name, followed by a comma (,), followed by
an index. For example, ip.tun0,1.


With no options, the entries are displayed in the order that they were
added, which is not necessarily the order in which the traffic match
takes place.


To view the order in which the traffic match will take place, use the -l
option. The rules are ordered such that all bypass rules are checked
first, then ESP rules, then AH rules. After that, they are checked in the
order entered.


Policy entries are not preserved across system restarts. Permanent policy
entries should be added to /etc/inet/ipsecinit.conf. This file is read by
the following smf(5) service:

svc:/network/ipsec/policy


See NOTES for more information on managing IPsec security policy and
SECURITY for issues in securing /etc/inet/ipsecinit.conf.

OPTIONS


ipsecconf supports the following options:

-a file

Add the IPsec policy to the system as specified by each entry in the
file. An IPsec configuration file contains one or more entries that
specify the configuration. Once the policy is added, all outbound and
inbound datagrams are subject to policy checks.

Entries in the files are described in the section below. Examples
can be found in the section below.

Policy is latched for TCP/UDP sockets on which a connect(3SOCKET) or
accept(3SOCKET) is issued. So, the addition of new policy entries may
not affect such endpoints or sockets. However, the policy will be
latched for a socket with an existing non-null policy. Thus, make
sure that there are no preexisting connections that will be subject
to checks by the new policy entries.

The feature of policy latching explained above may change in the
future. It is not advisable to depend upon this feature.


-c file

Check the syntax of the configuration file and report any errors
without making any changes to the policy. This option is useful when
debugging configurations and when smf(5) reports a configuration
error. See SECURITY.


-d index

Delete the host policy denoted by the index. The index is obtained by
invoking ipsecconf without any arguments, or with the -l option. See
DESCRIPTION for more information. Once the entry is deleted, all
outbound and inbound datagrams affected by this policy entry will not
be subjected to policy checks. Be advised that with connections for
which the policy has been latched, packets will continue to go out
with the same policy, even if it has been deleted. It is advisable to
use the -l option to find the correct policy index.


-d name,index

Delete the policy entry denoted by index on a tunnel denoted by name.
Since tunnels affect traffic that might originate off-node, latching
does not apply as it does in the host policy case. Equivalent to: -d
index -i name.


-f

Flush all the policies in the system. Constraints are similar to the
-d option with respect to latching and host versus per-tunnel
behavior.


-F

Flush all policies on all tunnels and also flush all host policies.


-i name

Specify a tunnel interface name for use with the -d, -f, or -l flags.


-l

Listing of a single policy table, defaulting to the host policy. When
ipsecconf is invoked without any arguments, a complete list of policy
entries with indexes added by the user since boot is displayed. The
current table can differ from the previous one if, for example, a
multi-homed entry was added or policy reordering occurred, or if a
single rule entry generates two spd rules In the case of a multi-
homed entry, all the addresses are listed explicitly. If a mask was
not specified earlier but was instead inferred from the address, it
will be explicitly listed here. This option is used to view policy
entries in the correct order. The outbound and inbound policy entries
are listed separately.


-L

Lists all policy tables, including host policy and all tunnel
instances (including configured but unplumbed).

If -i is specified, -L lists the policy table for a specific tunnel
interface.


-n

Show network addresses, ports, protocols in numbers. The -n option
may only be used with the -l option.


-q

Quiet mode. Suppresses the warning message generated when adding
policies.


OPERANDS


Each policy entry contains three parts specified as follows:

{pattern} action {properties}


or

{pattern} action {properties} ["or" action {properties}]*


Every policy entry begins on a new line and can span multiple lines. If
an entry exceeds the length of a line, you should split it only within a
"braced" section or immediately before the first (left-hand) brace of a
braced section. Avoid using the backslash character (\). See EXAMPLES.


The pattern section, as shown in the syntax above, specifies the traffic
pattern that should be matched against the outbound and inbound
datagrams. If there is a match, a specific action determined by the
second argument will be taken, depending upon the properties of the
policy entry.


If there is an or in the rule (multiple action-properties for a given
pattern), a transmitter will use the first action-property pair that
works, while a receiver will use any that are acceptable.


pattern and properties are name-value pairs where name and value are
separated by a <space>, <tab> or <newline>. Multiple name-value pairs
should be separated by <space>, <tab> or <newline>. The beginning and end
of the pattern and properties are marked by { and } respectively.


Files can contain multiple policy entries. An unspecified name-value pair
in the pattern will be considered as a wildcard. Wildcard entries match
any corresponding entry in the datagram.


One thing to remember is that UDP port 500 is always bypassed regardless
of any policy entries. This is a requirement for in.iked(1M) to work.


File can be commented by using a # as the first character. Comments may
be inserted either at the beginning or the end of a line.


The complete syntax of a policy entry is:

policy ::= { <pattern1> } <action1> { <properties1> } |
{ <pattern2> } <action2> { <properties2> }
[ 'or' <action2> { <properties2>} ]*

pattern1 ::= <pattern_name_value_pair1>*

pattern2 ::= <pattern_name_value_pair2>*

action1 ::= apply | permit | bypass | pass
action2 ::= bypass | pass | drop | ipsec

properties1 ::= {<prop_name_value_pair1>}
properties2 ::= {<prop_name_value_pair2>}


pattern_name_value_pair1 ::=
saddr <address>/<prefix> |
src <address>/<prefix> |
srcaddr <address>/<prefix> |
smask <mask> |
sport <port> |
daddr <address>/<prefix> |
dst <address>/<prefix> |
dstaddr <address>/<prefix> |
dmask <mask> |
dport <port> |
ulp <protocol> |
proto <protocol> |
type <icmp-type> |
type <number>-<number> |
code <icmp-code>
code <number>-<number>
tunnel <interface-name> |
negotiate <tunnel,transport>

pattern_name_value_pair2 ::=
raddr <address>/<prefix> |
remote <address>/<prefix> |
rport <port> |
laddr <address>/<prefix> |
local <address>/<prefix> |
lport <port> |
ulp <protocol> |
type <icmp-type> |
type <number>-<number> |
code <icmp-code> |
code <number>-<number>
proto <protocol> |
tunnel <interface-name> |
negotiate <tunnel,transport> |
dir <dir_val2>

address ::= <IPv4 dot notation> | <IPv6 colon notation> |
<String recognized by gethostbyname>|
<String recognized by getnetbyname>

prefix ::= <number>

mask ::= <0xhexdigit[hexdigit]> | <0Xhexdigit[hexdigit]> |
<IPv4 dot notation>

port ::= <number>| <String recognized by getservbyname>

protocol ::= <number>| <String recognized by getprotobyname>

prop_name_value_pair1 ::=
auth_algs <auth_alg> |
encr_algs <encr_alg> |
encr_auth_algs <auth_alg> |
sa <sa_val> |
dir <dir_val1>

prop_name_value_pair2 ::=
auth_algs <auth_alg> |
encr_algs <encr_alg> |
encr_auth_algs <auth_alg> |
sa <sa_val>

auth_alg ::= <auth_algname> ['(' <keylen> ')']
auth_algname ::= any | md5 | hmac-md5 | sha | sha1 | hmac-sha |
hmac-sha1 | hmac-sha256 | hmac-sha384 |
hmac-sha512 |<number>

encr_alg ::= <encr_algname> ['(' <keylen> ')']
encr_algname ::= any | aes | aes-cbc | des | des-cbc | 3des |
3des-cbc | blowfish | blowfish-cbc | <number>

keylen ::= <number> | <number>'..' | '..'<number> | <number>'..' \
<number>

sa_val ::= shared | unique

dir_val1 ::= out | in
dir_val2 ::= out | in | both

number ::= < 0 | 1 | 2 ... 9> <number>
icmp-type ::= <number> | unreach | echo | echorep | squench |
redir | timex | paramprob | timest | timestrep |
inforeq | inforep | maskreq | maskrep | unreach6 |
pkttoobig6 | timex6 | paramprob6 | echo6 | echorep6 |
router-sol6 | router-ad6 | neigh-sol6 | neigh-ad6 |
redir6

icmp-code ::= <number> | net-unr | host-unr | proto-unr | port-unr |
needfrag | srcfail | net-unk | host-unk | isolate |
net-prohib | host-prohib | net-tos | host-tos |
filter-prohib | host-preced | cutoff-preced |
no-route6 | adm-prohib6 | addr-unr6 | port-unr6 |
hop-limex6 | frag-re-timex6 | err-head6 | unrec-head6 |
unreq-opt6


Policy entries may contain the following (name value) pairs in the
pattern field. Each (name value) pair may appear only once in given
policy entry.

laddr/plen
local/plen

The value that follows is the local address of the datagram with the
prefix length. Only plen leading bits of the source address of the
packet will be matched. plen is optional. Local means destination on
incoming and source on outgoing packets. The source address value can
be a hostname as described in getaddrinfo(3SOCKET) or a network name
as described in getnetbyname(3XNET) or a host address or network
address in the Internet standard dot notation. See inet_addr(3XNET).
If a hostname is given and getaddrinfo(3SOCKET) returns multiple
addresses for the host, then policy will be added for each of the
addresses with other entries remaining the same.


raddr/plen
remote/plen

The value that follows is the remote address of the datagram with the
prefix length. Only plen leading bits of the remote address of the
packet will be matched. plen is optional. Remote means source on
incoming packets and destination on outgoing packets. The remote
address value can be a hostname as described in getaddrinfo(3SOCKET)
or a network name as described in getnetbyname(3XNET) or a host
address or network address in the Internet standard dot notation. See
inet_addr(3XNET). If a hostname is given and getaddrinfo(3SOCKET)
returns multiple addresses for the host, then policy will be added
for each of the addresses with other entries remaining the same.


src/plen
srcaddr/plen
saddr/plen

The value that follows is the source address of the datagram with the
prefix length. Only plen leading bits of the source address of the
packet will be matched. plen is optional.

The source address value can be a hostname as described in
getaddrinfo(3SOCKET) or a network name as described in
getnetbyname(3XNET) or a host address or network address in the
Internet standard dot notation. See inet_addr(3XNET).

If a hostname is given and getaddrinfo(3SOCKET) returns multiple
addresses for the host, then policy will be added for each of the
addresses with other entries remaining the same.


daddr/plen
dest/plen
dstaddr/plen

The value that follows is the destination address of the datagram
with the prefix length. Only plen leading bits of the destination
address of the packet will be matched. plen is optional.

See saddr for valid values that can be given. If multiple source and
destination addresses are found, then a policy entry that covers each
source address-destination address pair will be added to the system.


smask

For IPv4 only. The value that follows is the source mask. If prefix
length is given with saddr, this should not be given. This can be
represented either in hexadecimal number with a leading 0x or 0X, for
example, 0xffff0000, 0Xffff0000 or in the Internet decimal dot
notation, for example, 255.255.0.0 and 255.255.255.0. The mask should
be contiguous and the behavior is not defined for non-contiguous
masks.

smask is considered only when saddr is given.

For both IPv4 and IPv6 addresses, the same information can be
specified as a slen value attached to the saddr parameter.


dmask

Analogous to smask.


lport

The value that follows is the local port of the datagram. This can be
either a port number or a string searched with a NULL proto argument,
as described in getservbyname(3XNET)


rport

The value that follows is the remote port of the datagram. This can
be either a port number or a string searched with a NULL proto
argument, as described in getservbyname(3XNET)


sport

The value that follows is the source port of the datagram. This can
be either a port number or a string searched with a NULL proto
argument, as described in getservbyname(3XNET)


dport

The value that follows is the destination port of the datagram. This
can be either a port number or a string as described in
getservbyname(3XNET) searched with NULL proto argument.


proto ulp

The value that follows is the Upper Layer Protocol that this entry
should be matched against. It could be a number or a string as
described in getprotobyname(3XNET). If no smask or plen is specified,
a plen of 32 for IPv4 or 128 for IPv6 will be used, meaning a host.
If the ulp is icmp or ipv6-icmp, any action applying IPsec must be
the same for all icmp rules.


type num or num-num

The value that follows is the ICMP type that this entry should be
matched against. type must be a number from 0 to 255, or one of the
appropriate icmp-type keywords. Also, ulp must be present and must
specify either icmp or ipv6-icmp. A range of types can be specified
with a hyphen separating numbers.


code num or num-num

The value that follows is the ICMP code that this entry should be
matched against. The value following the keyword code must be a
number from 0 to 254 or one of the appropriate icmp-code keywords.
Also, type must be present. A range of codes can be specified with a
hyphen separating numbers.


tunnel name

Specifies a tunnel network interface, as configured with
ifconfig(1M). If a tunnel of name does not yet exist, the policy
entries are added anyway, and joined with the tunnel state when it is
created. If a tunnel is unplumbed, its policy entries disappear.


negotiate tunnel
negotiate transport

For per-tunnel security, specify whether the IPsec SAs protecting the
traffic should be tunnel-mode SAs or transport-mode SAs. If
transport-mode SAs are specified, no addresses can appear in the
policy entry. Transport-mode is backward compatible with Solaris 9,
and tunnel IPsec policies configured with ifconfig(1M) will show up
as transport mode entries here.


Policy entries may contain the following (name-value) pairs in the
properties field. Each (name-value) pair may appear only once in a given
policy entry.

auth_algs

An acceptable value following this implies that IPsec AH header will
be present in the outbound datagram. Values following this describe
the authentication algorithms that will be used while applying the
IPsec AH on outbound datagrams and verified to be present on inbound
datagrams. See RFC 2402.

This entry can contain either a string or a decimal number.

string

This should be either MD5 or HMAC-MD5 denoting the HMAC-MD5
algorithm as described in RFC 2403, and SHA1, or HMAC-SHA1 or SHA
or HMAC-SHA denoting the HMAC-SHA algorithm described in RFC
2404. You can use the ipsecalgs(1M) command to obtain the
complete list of authentication algorithms.

The string can also be ANY, which denotes no-preference for the
algorithm. Default algorithms will be chosen based upon the SAs
available at this time for manual SAs and the key negotiating
daemon for automatic SAs. Strings are not case-sensitive.


number

A number in the range 1-255. This is useful when new algorithms
can be dynamically loaded.

If auth_algs is not present, the AH header will not be present in the
outbound datagram, and the same will be verified for the inbound
datagram.


encr_algs

An acceptable value following this implies that IPsec ESP header will
be present in the outbound datagram. The value following this
describes the encryption algorithms that will be used to apply the
IPsec ESP protocol to outbound datagrams and verify it to be present
on inbound datagrams. See RFC 2406.

This entry can contain either a string or a decimal number. Strings
are not case-sensitive.

string

Can be one of the following:


string value: Algorithm Used: See RFC:
------------------------------------------------------
DES or DES-CBC DES-CBC 2405
3DES or 3DES-CBC 3DES-CBC 2451
BLOWFISH or BLOWFISH-CBC BLOWFISH-CBC 2451
AES or AES-CBC AES-CBC 2451

You can use the ipsecalgs(1M) command to obtain the complete list
of authentication algorithms.

The value can be NULL, which implies a NULL encryption, pursuant
to RFC 2410. This means that the payload will not be encrypted.
The string can also be ANY, which indicates no-preference for the
algorithm. Default algorithms will be chosen depending upon the
SAs available at the time for manual SAs and upon the key
negotiating daemon for automatic SAs. Strings are not case-
sensitive.


number

A decimal number in the range 1-255. This is useful when new
algorithms can be dynamically loaded.


encr_auth_algs

An acceptable value following encr_auth_algs implies that the IPsec
ESP header will be present in the outbound datagram. The values
following encr_auth_algs describe the authentication algorithms that
will be used while applying the IPsec ESP protocol on outbound
datagrams and verified to be present on inbound datagrams. See RFC
2406. This entry can contain either a string or a number. Strings are
case-insensitive.

string

Valid values are the same as the ones described for auth_algs
above.


number

This should be a decimal number in the range 1-255. This is
useful when new algorithms can be dynamically loaded.

If encr_algs is present and encr_auth_algs is not present in a policy
entry, the system will use an ESP SA regardless of whether the SA has
an authentication algorithm or not.

If encr_algs is not present and encr_auth_algs is present in a policy
entry, null encryption will be provided, which is equivalent to
encr_algs with NULL, for outbound and inbound datagrams.

If both encr_algs and encr_auth_algs are not present in a policy
entry, ESP header will not be present for outbound datagrams and the
same will be verified for inbound datagrams.

If both encr_algs and encr_auth_algs are present in a policy entry,
ESP header with integrity checksum will be present on outbound
datagrams and the same will be verified for inbound datagrams.

For encr_algs, encr_auth_algs, and auth_algs a key length
specification may be present. This is either a single value
specifying the only valid key length for the algorithm or a range
specifying the valid minimum and/or maximum key lengths. Minimum or
maximum lengths may be omitted.


dir

Values following this decides whether this entry is for outbound or
inbound datagram. Valid values are strings that should be one of the
following:

out

This means that this policy entry should be considered only for
outbound datagrams.


in

This means that this policy entry should be considered only for
inbound datagrams.


both

This means that this policy entry should be considered for both
inbound and outbound datagrams

This entry is not needed when the action is "apply", "permit" or
"ipsec". But if it is given while the action is "apply" or "permit",
it should be "out" or "in" respectively. This is mandatory when the
action is "bypass".


sa

Values following this decide the attribute of the security
association. Value indicates whether a unique security association
should be used or any existing SA can be used. If there is a policy
requirement, SAs are created dynamically on the first outbound
datagram using the key management daemon. Static SAs can be created
using ipseckey(1M). The values used here determine whether a new SA
will be used/obtained. Valid values are strings that could be one of
the following:

unique

Unique Association. A new/unused association will be
obtained/used for packets matching this policy entry. If an SA
that was previously used by the same 5 tuples, that is, {Source
address, Destination address, Source port, Destination Port,
Protocol (for example, TCP/UDP)} exists, it will be reused. Thus
uniqueness is expressed by the 5 tuples given above. The security
association used by the above 5 tuples will not be used by any
other socket. For inbound datagrams, uniqueness will not be
verified.

For tunnel-mode tunnels, unique is ignored. SAs are assigned per-
rule in tunnel-mode tunnels. For transport-mode tunnels, unique
is implicit, because the enforcement happens only on the outer-
packet addresses and protocol value of either IPv4-in-IP or
IPv6-in-IP.


shared

Shared association. If an SA exists already for this source-
destination pair, it will be used. Otherwise a new SA will be
obtained. This is the default.

This is mandatory only for outbound policy entries and should not be
given for entries whose action is "bypass". If this entry is not
given for inbound entries, for example, when "dir" is in or "action"
is permit, it will be assumed to be shared.


Action follows the pattern and should be given before properties. It
should be one of the following and this field is mandatory.

ipsec

Use IPsec for the datagram as described by the properties, if the
pattern matches the datagram. If ipsec is given without a dir spec ,
the pattern is matched to incoming and outgoing datagrams.


apply

Apply IPsec to the datagram as described by the properties, if the
pattern matches the datagram. If apply is given, the pattern is
matched only on the outbound datagram.


permit

Permit the datagram if the pattern matches the incoming datagram and
satisfies the constraints described by the properties. If it does not
satisfy the properties, discard the datagram. If permit is given, the
pattern is matched only for inbound datagrams.


bypass
pass

Bypass any policy checks if the pattern matches the datagram. dir in
the properties decides whether the check is done on outbound or
inbound datagrams. All the bypass entries are checked before
checking with any other policy entry in the system. This has the
highest precedence over any other entries. dir is the only field
that should be present when action is bypass.


drop

Drop any packets that match the pattern.


If the file contains multiple policy entries, for example, they are
assumed to be listed in the order in which they are to be applied. In
cases of multiple entries matching the outbound and inbound datagram, the
first match will be taken. The system will reorder the policy entry, that
is, add the new entry before the old entry, only when:


The level of protection is "stronger" than the old level of protection.


Currently, strength is defined as:

AH and ESP > ESP > AH


The standard uses of AH and ESP were what drove this ranking of
"stronger". There are flaws with this. ESP can be used either without
authentication, which will allow cut-and-paste or replay attacks, or
without encryption, which makes it equivalent or slightly weaker than AH.
An administrator should take care to use ESP properly. See ipsecesp(7P)
for more details.


If the new entry has bypass as action, bypass has the highest precedence.
It can be added in any order, and the system will still match all the
bypass entries before matching any other entries. This is useful for key
management daemons which can use this feature to bypass IPsec as it
protects its own traffic.


Entries with both AH (auth_algs present in the policy entry) and ESP
(encr_auth_algs or encr_auth_algs present in the policy entry) protection
are ordered after all the entries with AH and ESP and before any AH-only
and ESP-only entries. In all other cases the order specified by the user
is not modified, that is, newer entries are added at the end of all the
old entries. See .


A new entry is considered duplicate of the old entry if an old entry
matches the same traffic pattern as the new entry. See for information
on duplicates.

SECURITY


If, for example, the policy file comes over the wire from an NFS mounted
file system, an adversary can modify the data contained in the file, thus
changing the policy configured on the machine to suit his needs.
Administrators should be cautious about transmitting a copy of the policy
file over a network.


To prevent non-privileged users from modifying the security policy,
ensure that the configuration file is writable only by trusted users.


The configuration file is defined by a property of the policy smf(5)
service. The default configuration file, is /etc/inet/ipsecinit.conf.
This can be changed using the svcprop(1) command. See NOTES for more
details.


The policy description language supports the use of tokens that can be
resolved by means of a name service, using functions such as
gethostbyname(3NSL). While convenient, these functions are only secure
as the name service the system is configured to use. Great care should be
taken to secure the name service if it is used to resolve elements of the
security policy.


If your source address is a host that can be looked up over the network
and your naming system itself is compromised, then any names used will no
longer be trustworthy.


If the name switch is configured to use a name service that is not local
to the system, bypass policy entries might be required to prevent the
policy from preventing communication to the name service. See
nsswitch.conf(4).


Policy is latched for TCP/UDP sockets on which a connect(3SOCKET) or
accept(3SOCKET) has been issued. Adding new policy entries will not have
any effect on them. This feature of latching may change in the future. It
is not advisable to depend upon this feature.


The ipsecconf command can only be run by a user who has sufficient
privilege to open the pf_key(7P) socket. The appropriate privilege can be
assigned to a user with the Network IPsec Management profile. See
profiles(1), rbac(5), prof_attr(4).


Make sure to set up the policies before starting any communications, as
existing connections may be affected by the addition of new policy
entries. Similarly, do not change policies in the middle of a
communication.


Note that certain ndd tunables affect how policies configured with this
tool are enforced; see ipsecesp(7P) for more details.

EXAMPLES


Example 1: Protecting Outbound TCP Traffic With ESP and the AES Algorithm




The following example specified that any TCP packet from spiderweb to
arachnid should be encrypted with AES, and the SA could be a shared one.
It does not verify whether or not the inbound traffic is encrypted.


#
# Protect the outbound TCP traffic between hosts spiderweb
# and arachnid with ESP and use AES algorithm.
#
{
laddr spiderweb
raddr arachnid
ulp tcp
dir out
} ipsec {
encr_algs AES
}


Example 2: Verifying Whether or Not Inbound Traffic is Encrypted




Example 1 does not verify whether or not the inbound traffic is
encrypted. The entry in this example protects inbound traffic:


#
# Protect the TCP traffic on inbound with ESP/DES from arachnid
# to spiderweb
#
{
laddr spiderweb
raddr arachnid
ulp tcp
dir in
} ipsec {
encr_algs AES
}


sa can be absent for inbound policy entries as it implies that it can be
a shared one. Uniqueness is not verified on inbound. Note that in both
the above entries, authentication was never specified. This can lead to
cut and paste attacks. As mentioned previously, though the authentication
is not specified, the system will still use an ESP SA with encr_auth_alg
specified, if it was found in the SA tables.


Example 3: Protecting All Traffic Between Two Hosts




The following example protects both directions at once:


{
laddr spiderweb
raddr arachnid
ulp tcp
} ipsec {
encr_algs AES
}


Example 4: Authenticating All Inbound Traffic to the Telnet Port




This entry specifies that any inbound datagram to telnet port should come
in authenticated with the SHA1 algorithm. Otherwise the datagram should
not be permitted. Without this entry, traffic destined to port number 23
can come in clear. sa is not specified, which implies that it is shared.
This can be done only for inbound entries. You need to have an equivalent
entry to protect outbound traffic so that the outbound traffic is
authenticated as well, remove the dir.


#
# All the inbound traffic to the telnet port should be
# authenticated.
#
{
lport telnet
dir in
} ipsec {
auth_algs sha1
}


Example 5: Verifying Inbound Traffic is Null-Encrypted




The first entry specifies that any packet with address host-B should not
be checked against any policies. The second entry specifies that all
inbound traffic from network-B should be encrypted with a NULL encryption
algorithm and the MD5 authentication algorithm. NULL encryption implies
that ESP header will be used without encrypting the datagram. As the
first entry is bypass it need not be given first in order, as bypass
entries have the highest precedence. Thus any inbound traffic will be
matched against all bypass entries before any other policy entries.


#
# Make sure that all inbound traffic from network-B is NULL
# encrypted, but bypass for host-B alone from that network.
# Add the bypass first.
{
raddr host-B
dir in
} bypass {}

# Now add for network-B.
{
raddr network-B/16
dir in
} ipsec {
encr_algs NULL
encr_auth_algs md5
}


Example 6: Entries to Bypass Traffic from IPsec




The first two entries provide that any datagram leaving the machine with
source port 53 or coming into port number 53 should not be subjected to
IPsec policy checks, irrespective of any other policy entry in the
system. Thus the latter two entries will be considered only for ports
other than port number 53.


#
# Bypass traffic for port no 53
#
{lport 53} bypass {}
{rport 53} bypass {}
{raddr spiderweb } ipsec {encr_algs any sa unique}


Example 7: Protecting Outbound Traffic



#
# Protect the outbound traffic from all interfaces.
#
{raddr spiderweb dir out} ipsec {auth_algs any sa unique}


If the gethostbyname(3XNET) call for spiderweb yields multiple addresses,
multiple policy entries will be added for all the source address with the
same properties.


{
laddr arachnid
raddr spiderweb
dir in
} ipsec {auth_algs any sa unique}


If the gethostbyname(3XNET) call for spiderweb and the
gethostbyname(3XNET) call for arachnid yield multiple addresses, multiple
policy entries will be added for each (saddr daddr) pair with the same
properties. Use ipsecconf -l to view all the policy entries added.


Example 8: Bypassing Unauthenticated Traffic



#
# Protect all the outbound traffic with ESP except any traffic
# to network-b which should be authenticated and bypass anything
# to network-c
#
{raddr network-b/16 dir out} ipsec {auth_algs any}
{dir out} ipsec {encr_algs any}
{raddr network-c/16 dir out} bypass {} # NULL properties


Note that bypass can be given anywhere and it will take precedence over
all other entries. NULL pattern matches all the traffic.


Example 9: Encrypting IPv6 Traffic with 3DES and MD5




The following entry on the host with the link local address
fe80::a00:20ff:fe21:4483 specifies that any outbound traffic between the
hosts with IPv6 link-local addresses fe80::a00:20ff:fe21:4483 and
fe80::a00:20ff:felf:e346 must be encrypted with 3DES and MD5.


{
laddr fe80::a00:20ff:fe21:4483
raddr fe80::a00:20ff:felf:e346
dir out
} ipsec {
encr_algs 3DES
encr_auth_algs MD5
}


Example 10: Verifying IPv6 Traffic is Authenticated with SHA1




The following two entries require that all IPv6 traffic to and from the
IPv6 site-local network fec0:abcd::0/32 be authenticated with SHA1.


{raddr fec0:abcd::0/32} ipsec { auth_algs SHA1 }


Example 11: Key Lengths



# use aes at any key length
{raddr spiderweb} ipsec {encr_algs aes}

# use aes with a 192 bit key
{raddr spiderweb} ipsec {encr_algs aes(192)}

# use aes with any key length up to 192 bits
# i.e. 192 bits or less
{raddr spiderweb} ipsec {encr_algs aes(..192)}

# use aes with any key length of 192 or more
# i.e. 192 bits or more
{raddr spiderweb} ipsec {encr_algs aes(192..)}

#use aes with any key from 192 to 256 bits
{raddr spiderweb} ipsec {encr_algs aes(192..256)}

#use any algorithm with a key of 192 bits or longer
{raddr spiderweb} ipsec {encr_algs any(192..)}


Example 12: Correct and Incorrect Policy Entries




The following are examples of correctly formed policy entries:


{ raddr that_system rport telnet } ipsec { encr_algs 3des encr_auth_algs
sha1 sa shared}

{
raddr that_system
rport telnet
} ipsec {
encr_algs 3des
encr_auth_algs sha1
sa shared
}

{ raddr that_system rport telnet } ipsec
{ encr_algs 3des encr_auth_algs sha1 sa shared}

{ raddr that_system rport telnet } ipsec
{ encr_algs 3des encr_auth_algs sha1 sa shared} or ipsec
{ encr_algs aes encr_auth_algs sha1 sa shared}


...and the following is an incorrectly formed entry:


{ raddr that_system rport telnet } ipsec
{ encr_algs 3des encr_auth_algs sha1 sa shared}
or ipsec { encr_algs aes encr_auth_algs sha1 sa shared}


In the preceding, incorrect entry, note that the third line begins with
"or ipsec". Such an entry causes ipsecconf to return an error.


Example 13: Allowing Neighbor Discovery to Occur in the Clear




The following two entries require that all IPv6 traffic to and from the
IPv6 site-local network fec0:abcd::0/32 be authenticated with SHA1. The
second entry allows neighbor discovery to operate correctly.


{raddr fec0:abcd::0/32} ipsec { auth_algs SHA1 }
{raddr fec0:abcd::0/32 ulp ipv6-icmp type 133-137 dir both }
pass { }


Example 14: Using "or"




The following entry allows traffic using the AES or Blowfish algorithms
from the remote machine spiderweb:


{raddr spiderweb} ipsec {encr_algs aes} or ipsec {encr_algs blowfish}


Example 15: Configuring a Tunnel to be Backward-Compatible with Solaris 9




The following example is equivalent to "encr_algs aes encr_auth_algs md5"
in ifconfig(1M):


{tunnel ip.tun0 negotiate transport} ipsec {encr_algs aes
encr_auth_algs md5}


Example 16: Configuring a Tunnel to a VPN client with an Assigned Address




The following example assumes a distinct "inside" network with its own
topology, such that a client's default route goes "inside".


# Unlike route(1m), the default route has to be spelled-out.
{tunnel ip.tun0 negotiate tunnel raddr client-inside/32
laddr 0.0.0.0/0} ipsec {encr_algs aes encr_auth_algs sha1}


Example 17: Transit VPN router between Two Tunnelled Subnets and a Third




The following example specifies a configuration for a VPN router that
routes between two tunnelled subnets and a third subnet that is on-link.
Consider remote-site A, remote-site B, and local site C, each with a /24
address allocation.


# ip.tun0 between me (C) and remote-site A.
# Cover remote-site A to remote-side B.
{tunnel ip.tun0 negotiate tunnel raddr A-prefix/24 laddr
B-prefix/24} ipsec {encr_algs 3des encr_auth_algs md5}

# Cover remote-site A traffic to my subnet.
{tunnel ip.tun0 negotiate tunnel raddr A-prefix/24 laddr
C-prefix/24} ipsec {encr_algs 3des encr_auth_algs md5}

# ip.tun1 between me (C) and remote-site B.
# Cover remote-site B to remote-site A.
{tunnel ip.tun1 negotiate tunnel raddr B-prefix/24 laddr
A-prefix/24} ipsec {encr_algs aes encr_auth_algs sha1}

# Cover remote-site B traffic to my subnet.
{tunnel ip.tun1 negotiate tunnel raddr B-prefix/24 laddr
C-prefix/24} ipsec {encr_algs aes encr_auth_algs md5}


FILES


/var/run/ipsecpolicy.conf

Cache of IPsec policies currently configured for the system,
maintained by ipsecconf command. Do not edit this file.


/etc/inet/ipsecinit.conf

File containing IPsec policies to be installed at system restart by
the policy smf(5) service. See NOTES for more information.


/etc/inet/ipsecinit.sample

Sample input file for ipseconf.


ATTRIBUTES


See attributes(5) for descriptions of the following attributes:


+--------------------+-----------------+
| ATTRIBUTE TYPE | ATTRIBUTE VALUE |
+--------------------+-----------------+
|Interface Stability | Committed |
+--------------------+-----------------+

SEE ALSO


auths(1), profiles(1), svcprop(1), svcs(1), in.iked(1M), init(1M),
ifconfig(1M), ipsecalgs(1M), ipseckey(1M), svcadm(1M), svccfg(1M),
gethostbyname(3NSL), accept(3SOCKET), connect(3SOCKET),
gethostbyname(3XNET), getnetbyname(3XNET), getprotobyname(3XNET),
getservbyname(3XNET), getaddrinfo(3SOCKET), socket(3SOCKET),
ike.config(4), nsswitch.conf(4), prof_attr(4), user_attr(4),
attributes(5), rbac(5), smf(5), ipsecah(7P), ipsecesp(7P), pf_key(7P)


Glenn, R. and Kent, S. RFC 2410, The NULL Encryption Algorithm and Its
Use With IPsec. The Internet Society. 1998.


Kent, S. and Atkinson, R. RFC 2402, IP Authentication Header.The Internet
Society. 1998.


Kent, S. and Atkinson, R. RFC 2406, IP Encapsulating Security Payload
(ESP). The Internet Society. 1998.


Madsen, C. and Glenn, R. RFC 2403, The Use of HMAC-MD5-96 within ESP and
AH. The Internet Society. 1998.


Madsen, C. and Glenn, R. RFC 2404, The Use of HMAC-SHA-1-96 within ESP
and AH. The Internet Society. 1998.


Madsen, C. and Doraswamy, N. RFC 2405, The ESP DES-CBC Cipher Algorithm
With Explicit IV. The Internet Society. 1998.


Pereira, R. and Adams, R. RFC 2451, The ESP CBC-Mode Cipher Algorithms.
The Internet Society. 1998.


Frankel, S. and Kelly, R. Glenn, The AES Cipher Algorithm and Its Use
With IPsec. 2001.

DIAGNOSTICS


Bad "string" on line N.
Duplicate "string" on line N.

string refers to one of the names in pattern or properties. A Bad
string indicates that an argument is malformed; a Duplicate string
indicates that there are multiple arguments of a similar type, for
example, multiple Source Address arguments.


Interface name already selected

Dual use of -i name and name,index for an index.


Error before or at line N.

Indicates parsing error before or at line N.


Non-existent index

Reported when the index for delete is not a valid one.


spd_msg return: File exists

Reported when there is already a policy entry that matches the
traffic of this new entry.


NOTES


IPsec manual keys are managed by the service management facility, smf(5).
The services listed below manage the components of IPsec. These services
are delivered as follows:

svc:/network/ipsec/policy:default (enabled)
svc:/network/ipsec/ipsecalgs:default (enabled)
svc:/network/ipsec/manual-key:default (disabled)
svc:/network/ipsec/ike:default (disabled)


The manual-key service is delivered disabled. The system administrator
must create manual IPsec Security Associations (SAs), as described in
ipseckey(1M), before enabling that service.


The policy service is delivered enabled, but without a configuration
file, so that, as a starting condition, packets are not protected by
IPsec. After you create the configuration file /etc/inet/ipsecinit.conf,
as described in this man page, and refresh the service (svcadm refresh,
see below), the policy contained in the configuration file is applied. If
there is an error in this file, the service enters maintenance mode.


Services that are delivered disabled are delivered that way because the
system administrator must create configuration files for those services
before enabling them. See ike.config(4) for the ike service.


See ipsecalgs(1M) for the ipsecalgs service.


The correct administrative procedure is to create the configuration file
for each service, then enable each service using svcadm(1M).


If the configuration needs to be changed, edit the configuration file
then refresh the service, as follows:

example# svcadm refresh policy


The smf(5) framework will record any errors in the service-specific log
file. Use any of the following commands to examine the logfile property:

example# svcs -l policy
example# svcprop policy
example# svccfg -s policy listprop


The following property is defined for the policy service:

config/config_file


This property can be modified using svccfg(1M) by users who have been
assigned the following authorization:

solaris.smf.value.ipsec


See auths(1), user_attr(4), rbac(5).


The service needs to be refreshed using svcadm(1M) before the new
property is effective. General non-modifiable properties can be viewed
with the svcprop(1) command.

# svccfg -s ipsec/policy setprop config/config_file = /new/config_file
# svcadm refresh policy


Administrative actions on this service, such as enabling, disabling,
refreshing, and requesting restart can be performed using svcadm(1M). A
user who has been assigned the authorization shown below can perform
these actions:

solaris.smf.manage.ipsec


The service's status can be queried using the svcs(1) command.


The ipsecconf command is designed to be managed by the policy smf(5)
service. While the ipsecconf command can be run from the command line,
this is discouraged. If the ipsecconf command is to be run from the
command line, the policy smf(5) service should be disabled first. See
svcadm(1M).


April 9, 2016 IPSECCONF(1M)